lifeasdaddy: Why was HMAS Sydney (II) sunk?

The wreck of HMAS Sydney (II) has been found, and can be assumed to be the final resting place for most of her 645 crew.

The decades old query about why she was sunk has resurfaced and the controversy continues in an item from today's Sydney Morning Herald:

Professor Tom Frame, a former Anglican bishop to the Australian Defence Force and author of HMAS Sydney: Loss And Controversy, stepped into the latest row on Friday to defend the honour of the boat's commanding officer.

Dr Frame said Captain Joseph Burnett had been "terribly defamed" by a survivor from the Kormoran, the German armed merchant "raider" that on November 19, 1941, sank the Australian light cruiser in the Indian Ocean, killing all 645 crew.

Ludwig Ernst, 89, the president of the Kormoran Survivors' Association, told The West Australian newspaper that Burnett's actions during the fateful encounter were "incompetent" and "criminal".

"Eventually Australians will have to comprehend that the guilty party for Sydney's sinking is Captain Burnett," Mr Ernst said.

Well, what do the archives say?

Commander (later Captain) Emile Dechaineux was sent to Perth to coordinate the investigation and particularly the interrogation of the POW Kormoran survivors. He arrived in Perth on 28 November 1941.

On 30 November 1941 Sir Dudley Pound the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty in London sent a signal to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board:

When you have been able to collect from prisoners all available information regarding action between SYDNEY and raider, grateful if you would let me know what happened so that we can deduce any lessons for the future.

[ Naval War Diary, message 1st Sea Lord to ACNB, 1115A/30 November. Naval Historical Branch { from Captain Peter Hore's fine book HMAS Sydney II: The cruiser and the controversy in the archives of the United Kingdom}]

The response can be found in the National Archives of Australia as Interrogation of German survivors ex Raider 41 "Kormoran" [ NAA: MP1049/5, 412871 ]

Here's page 4 of 36 pages from the online document:

This was sent to the Admiralty from the Naval Board on 23 December 1941.

At point number 1. close to the bottom of the page it states, "CAPTAIN OF "SYDNEY" WAS DECEIVED AND PLACED HIMSELF IN TACTICALLY UNSOUND POSITION."

For the sake of completeness, here is the next page of the 2 page communique. (page 5 of the 36 page online document)

The file next shows Commander Dechaineux's draft, as an internal Minute Paper. (page 6 of 36 pages in the online document)

The next page of his draft (page 7 of 36 pages in the online document) has as the corresponding point number 1. in lessons learnt as:

1. Captain of "SYDNEY" was deceived and placed himself in tactically unsound position. ~~The contributory cause of this is the admitted inefficiency of Merchant Ships in challenge and reply procedure~~.

We see also the signature Dechaineux at the bottom of the typescript.

There is another significant matter to consider. The way in which the Official History of the Royal Australian Navy in WWII was written. The official naval war historian was Mr. G. Hermon Gill. His two volume history is the starting point for any serious reader about WWII RAN naval history.

There's a very interesting correspondence relating to Gill's writing about the sinking of HMAS Sydney II, which has been highlighted by Richard Summerrell:

An interesting postscript to the official inquiries into the loss of the Sydney is revealed in the correspondence of R B M Long, the former Director of Naval Intelligence with G Hermon Gill, the official navy war historian in 1953. It appears that Gill referred to Long for his comments copies of his draft chapters of the official war history (including chapter 12, the chapter in which Gill deals with the loss of the Sydney).

In Long’s reply of 23 November 1953 he remarked that chapter 12 ‘is the best one you have done so far’. He went on to comment on Gill’s treatment of the story, particularly the conjecture as to why Burnett appeared to have put the Sydney in a position of vulnerability.
‘I think you handle the subject with great tact, very fairly and with literary skill. It is a part of the History that will be closely read and as Joe Burnett’s two sons are now rising in rank as Naval Officers it is important that they should be able to read that section without distress. I don’t know who it was who said that we all make mistakes and the man who doesn’t makes nothing. Burnett’s mistakes and the loss of the Sydney of course must be his responsibility (whether he happened to be sick or dead at the time of the action is of little consequence) and his reputation must be carried by his sons, but I think that you have given such a decent slant to the matter that they need never be even embarrassed.’
Commenting on other sections of the draft Long noted
‘The search for the Kormoran films commenced as a military expedition, certainly within six months of the Kormoran prisoners being put into stir. It continued intermittently until 1945... You probably know that I, personally, continued for over two years, a world search and on the flimsiest stories, for some indication as to the Sydney’s end. I well remember an expedition that was outfitted for me on the Gold Coast and bunged up country into Vichey/French Territory on a statement that some nine Germans, mostly officers, with two British prisoners, had gone inland from Dakar. I just can’t remember the full extent of the search but I remember it also took in Kerguelan [sic] and there was a case of the “Two Sailors” in the mountainous country back in Natal. It is correct to say that “not a stone was left unturned”.’
Part of Long’s response appears to have been used by Gill in the official history. At page 460, Gill states
‘Australian naval intelligence continued for some years a search for any information which would throw light on the fate of Sydney’s company. The flimsiest stories were followed up, and the search ranged from Central Africa to Kerguelen, but without success.

[ I have removed Richard Summerrell's footnotes from this excerpt, but the full text can be read online here. ]

SUMMARY

Firstly, Dechaineux's report on the sinking of HMAS Sydney, mainly arising from POW Kormoran survivor interrogations, stated that the Captain of HMAS Sydney was deceived and allowed himself to be placed in a tactically unsound position.

Secondly, the official historian was praised for writing about HMAS Sydney's demise so as not to cause distress or embarrassment to the sons of the Captain who were themselves in rising RAN careers.